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THE COURTS, NOT THE ARBITRATOR, MUST DECIDE CLASS ARBITRABILITY UNLESS CLEARLY AND
UNMISTAKABLY GRANTED IN THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT: A COMMENT ON 20/20 COMMUNS.,
INC. V. CRAWFORD
By
Andrew Peretin*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently determined that a court, not
an arbitrator, needs to decide the gateway issue of class arbitration unless the arbitration
agreement clearly and unmistakably grants this authority to the arbitrator.1 The court determined
that class arbitration is considered a gateway issue, which is a threshold question of arbitrability
because class arbitration fundamentally differs from individual arbitration.2 In 20/20 Communs.,
Inc. v. Crawford, there was a general delegation clause giving the arbitrator the power to decide
arbitrability issues and the arbitration agreement incorporated the American Arbitration
Association (“AAA”) rules providing that an arbitrator has the power to determine class
arbitrability.3 However, because a clause that appeared to generally prohibit class arbitration
existed in the arbitration agreement, it was determined that the courts, not the arbitrator had the
power to determine whether class arbitrability could proceed.4 This ruling overturned the district
court decision in 20/20 Communs., Inc. v. Blevins, which held that the arbitrator had been
granted the power to decide the gateway issue of class arbitration.5
II.

CASE BACKGROUND

20/20 Communications, Inc. (“20/20”) is a national company that primarily focuses on
direct-sales and marketing.6 20/20 employs field sales managers.7 The field sales managers are
required to sign a “Mutual Arbitration Agreement” (“MAA”) upon employment.8 The MAA was
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meant to be the sole agreement between 20/20 Communications and its employees for dispute
resolution.9
The MAA stipulated that the parties would submit any and all disputes and claims to
arbitration.10 The agreement covered almost all claims, including: wages, overtime, benefits or
other compensation, and breach of any express or implied contracts.11 Under the terms of the
agreement, the Federal Arbitration Act and Texas law governed enforcement of the agreement
and its ability to compel arbitration.12 The MAA further stated that the arbitrator is limited to use
of the MAA and controlling law for determining disputed maters.13 In the process, the arbitrator
should apply the American Arbitration Association’s (“AAA”) National Rules for the Resolution
of Employment Disputes unless the rules conflict with the contract.14
The agreement stated that the arbitrator has the ability to resolve the arbitrability issues if
the parties disagree over the MAA’s formation or meaning.15 Last, and of most significance to
the Fifth Circuit, the arbitration agreement stated:
[T]he parties agree that this Agreement prohibits the arbitrator from consolidating
the claims of others into one proceeding to the maximum extent permitted by law.
This means that the arbitrator will hear only individual claims and does not have
the authority to fashion a proceeding as a class or collective action or to award relief
to a group of employees in one proceeding, to the maximum extent permitted by
law . . . Employer may use this Agreement to defeat any attempt by Employee to
file or join other employees in a class, collective, or join action lawsuit or
arbitration, but the Employer shall not retaliate against Employee for any such
attempt.16
The purpose of the clause above was for 20/20 to expressly prohibit class arbitration and
to prohibit the arbitrator from even having the authority to consolidate claims into a class. This
demonstrates the party’s clear intent not to allow class arbitration to the extent that the laws
allow this.
9

Blevins at 570.
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From April 11, 2016 until May 13, 2016, eighteen field sales managers filed individually
for arbitration.17 The individual claims stated that 20/20 failed to pay overtime compensation in
violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”).18 Each individual employee demanded an
arbitrator “with knowledge of employment law, specifically the FLSA, collective action under
the FLSA and the National Labor Relations Act” to preside.19
On August 5, 2016, 20/20 contended that one of the defendants amended their claim to
assert a class action for arbitration after an initial case-management conference.20 In response,
20/20 filed a suit (Blevins) seeking declaratory judgment on whether the court, not the arbitrator,
should decide whether arbitration was available under the MAA; and whether class action was
available in this case.21
While the district court proceedings were pending, some employees requested that the
arbitrators issue a statement that a class arbitration bar is prohibited under the National Labor
Relations Act. (“NLRA”)22 Of the eighteen cases of arbitration filed, six arbitrators issued
awards, and of importance, one stated that the class arbitration bar was unenforceable under the
NLRA.23 20/20 filed a separate action (Crawford) in federal court to vacate the class arbitration
bar under the NLRA.24 The district court rejected the request and confirmed the award in
Crawford.25 Additionally, the district court in the first case Blevins, held that the arbitration
agreement authorized the arbitrator, not the courts, to determine class arbitrability.26 The Fifth
Circuit consolidated Blevins and Crawford for the purpose of appeal and decided that courts, not
judges, determine the gateway issue of class arbitration in the absence of clear and unmistakable
language granting the question to an arbitrator.27
III.

THE DISTRICT COURT PROCEEDINGS OF BLEVINS
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In Blevins, the district court began its analysis by stating that Section 2 of the FAA
governed.28 The court then stated that there is a strong federal policy in favor of arbitration and
that “ambiguities as to the scope of the arbitration clause itself [must be] resolved in favor of
arbitration.”29.
The court summarized the arguments of both parties then examined the delegation-clause
issue that it determined was key in the dispute.30 The court defined a delegation clause as “an
agreement to arbitrate threshold issues concerning the arbitration agreement.”31 For delegation
clause questions, the court performs a two part analysis that begins by asking whether the parties
entered into any arbitration agreement at all.32 Then the court determines whether the agreement
had a delegation clause.33
In this case, the parties did not contest whether they entered into a valid arbitration
agreement, so the court only needed to determine whether the MAA had a delegation clause.34
The court found that the MAA had a delegation clause.35 The court’s analysis then was focused
on whether the question of arbitrability fit within the delegation clause’s language.36 The court
rephrased this and asked whether the delegation clause covered class arbitration, which is a
gateway issue.37 Gateway issues are disputes that a court has the power to determine.38 Courts
have this ability unless the parties clearly and unmistakably state that the arbitrator should
determine the issue.39 In this case, the court held that the MAA met this clear and unmistakable
standard and that the arbitrator should decide on the issue of whether the arbitration agreement
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would allow arbitration.40 The court came to this conclusion based on the following three main
reasons.41
First, the court analyzed the plain meaning of the contract.42 The court noted that its
objective was to determine the party’s intentions and to enforce the intentions as written when
unambiguous.43 The court determined that the language of the delegation clause was
unambiguous and it allowed for the arbitrator to determine disagreements related to the MAA’s
formation or meaning.44 The court determined that the issue of whether a party may arbitrate as a
class clearly concerns the MAA’s meaning and thus was reserved explicitly for the arbitrator to
decide. 45 The court then cited the Supreme Court’s interpretation of similar contractual language
in Rent-A-Center.46 In Rent-A-Center, the following clause was considered a delegation clause:
“[t]he Arbitrator . . . shall have exclusive authority to resolve any dispute relating to the
interpretation, applicability, [or] enforceability . . . of this Agreement.”47 The district court
believed that the MAA’s language is similar to the delegation clause in Rent-A-Center, and that it
gives the arbitrator the power to determine arbitrability issues.48 The district court determined
that the court thus lacked the subject-matter jurisdiction to decide this issue.49
Second, the court found that incorporating the rules of the AAA provided additional support
for the interpretation that the arbitrator should decide the issue of class arbitrability.50 After the
Supreme Court decided Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle., the AAA arbitration rules, including
the specific action and separate Supplementary Rules for Class Action were enacted.51 Part of the
AAA Employment Rules state that the arbitrator will apply the AAA rules if there is a material
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inconsistency with the rules and the arbitration agreement.52 Further, Supplementary Rule 3
contains the “Clause Construction Award” which lets the arbitrator decide whether to permit
class arbitration based on the arbitration clause.53
The court then cited the following Fifth Circuit cases that addressed incorporating the AAA
rules as evidence that the parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability.54 In Petrofac. Inc. v.
DynMcDermott Petroleum Operations Co., the court held that adopting the AAA rules was clear
and convincing evidence that the parties decided to arbitrate arbitrability.55 Additionally, in Reed
v. Florida Metropolitan University, the Fifth Circuit held that the district court properly decided
that the arbitrator should decide class-arbitration in this case because “the parties here consented
to the Supplementary Rules, and therefore agreed to submit the class arbitration issue to the
arbitrator.”56 The court thus decided to expressly decline 20/20’s proposition that the MAA’s
preclusion to class arbitration overrides the Supplementary Rules of the AAA that was
incorporated.57
Third, the court found that the arbitration agreement’s broad language in favor of disputes
being resolved through arbitration deprived the court of its ability to determine if class arbitration
was allowed.58 The MAA stated that “all disputes and claims . . . shall be determined exclusively
by final and binding arbitration . . . .”59 The Fifth Circuit, in Pedcor Mgmt. Co., Inc. Welfare
Benefit Plan v. Nations Personnel of Texas, held that if an arbitration agreement that is disputed
has broad language, including a contract clause that submits all disputes or claims arising or
relating to the agreement to arbitrate, then class arbitration should be determined by the
arbitrator.”60 The court stated that although the language in Pedcor is more narrow, the reasoning
still held.61
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Finally, the court disagreed with 20/20 and did not believe Epic Systems governs this issue.62
In Epic Systems, the Supreme Court held that an arbitration agreement that required individual
arbitration, rather than allowed class actions, was enforceable under the FAA.63 20/20 argued
that Epic Systems created a rule that arbitration agreements that have a class-action waiver
override provisions that could delegate questions of class-action to the arbitrator.64 The court did
not agree.65 The court believed that Epic Systems only recognized the enforceability of classaction waivers, but did not decide the question of who should resolve the arbitrability of class
claims.66 The court also stated that the arbitrator may decide whether Epic Systems resolves the
current issue.67 In conclusion, the court decided that whether the defendant should be able to
proceed as a class is a decision for an arbitrator and not the court.68
IV.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT’S ANALYSIS

In Crawford, at the district level, the court rejected 20/20’s action to vacate the class
arbitration bar declared by an arbitrator.69 20/20 appealed and the Fifth Circuit took the case.70
After hearing oral arguments, the district court in Blevin held that the arbitrator and not the
courts determined class arbitrability.71 The Fifth Circuit joined both cases for appeal.72
The Fifth Circuit describes the two principle questions as whether class arbitration is a
gateway issue which the courts should decide, and whether this arbitration agreement had clear
and unmistakable language that the arbitrator should decide instead of the court.73 The Fifth
Circuit noted that the Supreme Court has not decided if class arbitrability is a gateway issue.74
The Fifth Circuit recognized that it has not yet addressed this issue.75
62
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The Fifth Circuit then noted that other circuit courts have all decided that class arbitrability is
a gateway issue.76 The Fifth Circuit sided with the sister circuits and held that class arbitrability
is a gateway issue that a court and not an arbitrator should decide unless there is clear and
unmistakable language granting the authority to the arbitrator.77 The Fifth Circuit reasoned that
class and individual arbitration differ in fundamental ways.78
The Supreme Court has previously expressed the difference in form, that “[t]he class action
is an exception to the usual rule that litigation is conducted by, and on behalf of, the individual
named parties only.”79 The Fifth Circuit then asserted that there are significant practical and
substantive consequences of class arbitration.80 The Fifth Circuit stated that class arbitration adds
to not only the size, but also the complexity of arbitration.81 Additionally, due process concerns
arise.82 As AT&T Mobility mentioned, the absent parties must “be afforded notice, an opportunity
to be heard, and a right to opt out of the class.”83 This has the potential to increase the cost and
compromise efficiency.84 The Fifth Circuit also recognized that privacy and confidentiality are
key aspects of arbitration.85 Class arbitration could thus threaten parties’ perceived assumption of
privacy and confidentiality.86
After determining that class arbitration is a gateway issue, the Fifth Circuit then turned to
the question of whether the parties clearly and unmistakably agreed to have the arbitrator
determine the issue.87 The Fifth Circuit quoted the following language from the MAA to
demonstrate the party’s intent to preclude class arbitration:
76

Crawford at 718. See Del Webb Cmtys., Inc. v. Carlson, 817 F.3d 867, 877 (4th Cir. 2016); Reed Elsevier, Inc. ex
rel. LexisNexis Div. v. Crockett, 734 F.3d 594, 599 (6th Cir. 2013); Herrington v. WaterstoneMortg. Corp., 907 F.3d
502, 506-07 (7th Cir. 2018); Catamaran Corp. v. Towncrest Pharmacy, 864 F.3d 966, 972 (8th Cir. 2017); Eshagh
v. Termnix Int’l Co., L.P., 588 F. App’x 703, 704 (9th Cir. 2014) (unpublished); JPay, Inc. v. Kobel, 904 F.3d 923,
935-36 (11th Cir. 2018).
77

Id. Contra. JPay at 923; Wells Fargo Advisors, LLC v. Sappington, 884 F.3d 392, 27 (2d Cir. 2019) (concluding
that a delegation clause is enough to give the arbitrator the power to decide class arbitrability).
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Id. (citing Wal-Mart Stores. Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 348 (2011) quoting (Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S.
682, 700-01 (1979))).
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Id. See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 348 (2011) (stating class arbitration “makes the
process slower, more costly, and more likely to generate procedural morass than final judgment”).
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[t]he parties agree that this Agreement prohibits the arbitrator from consolidating
the claims of others into one proceeding, to the maximum extent permitted by law.
This means that an arbitrator will hear only individual claims and does not have the
authority to fashion a proceeding as a class or collective action or to award relief to
a group of employees in one proceeding, to the maximum extent permitted by law.88
The Fifth Circuit concluded that this clause precluded class arbitration to the maximum
extent of law and clearly demonstrated the party’s intent to disallow class arbitration.89 The Fifth
Circuit found that categorically prohibiting class arbitration, and then vesting the arbitrator the
authority to decide on class arbitration, was illogical.90 The Fifth Circuit held that there was not
clear and unmistakable language which is required to give the arbitrator the authority to decide
on class arbitration.91
The Fifth Circuit recognized the three provisions cited by the employees.92 These included:
the disagreement over issues of formation being decided by arbitrator; the incorporation of the
AAA rules, which explicitly state that when the rules are inconsistent with the agreement, the
agreement governs; and the clause that all disputes are determined exclusively by final and
binding arbitration, noting that the clause begins with the phrase “except as provided below.”93
The Fifth Circuit recognized that those provisions, separated from the class arbitration bar,
could be construed as granting the arbitrator the power to decide the issue of class arbitration.94
The Fifth Circuit also recognized Robinson, which stated that broad coverage language similar to
the language in the provision, gives the arbitrator the power to decide the availability of class
arbitration.95 The Fifth Circuit then stated that examining whether the three clauses on their own
is enough to decide the question of arbitrability is not necessary.96 The Fifth Circuit decided that
when the three provisions cited by the employees were compared with the class arbitration bar,
none of the provisions contained the clear and unmistakable language necessary for the arbitrator
to decide the issue of class arbitration.97
The Fifth Circuit noted that two of the provisions have expressed exceptions that negate the
provisions if they contradict with any other provision in the arbitration agreement, which the
88
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court found they clearly do.98 Additionally, the Fifth Circuit does not think the exception clauses
have the specificity required.99 In contrast, the class arbitration bar specifically prohibits class
arbitration disputes.100
In conclusion, because the provisions do not clearly and unmistakably give the arbitrator the
authority to decide class arbitrability, courts, not arbitrators, are required to decide the issue of
class arbitration.101
V.

SIGNIFICANCE

The major significance from 2020 Communs., Inc. v. Crawford case is that a class bar
overcomes general delegation clauses and incorporation of the AAA’s rules and gives the courts,
not the arbitrator, the power to decide class arbitrability. Significantly, the Fifth Circuit did not
address whether the general delegation clause and incorporation of the AAA’s rules can give the
arbitrator the power to decide class arbitration when no class bar exists.102 In order to draft an
arbitration clause that allows an arbitrator to decide class arbitrability, general delegation clauses
and AAA rules do not meet the standard of clear and unmistakable. Including a clause that states
class arbitrability is delegated to the arbitrator as part of a delegation clause could help prevent
this dispute in the future.
VI.

CRITIQUE

The major critique in this case is that the plain language of the MAA appears to delegate the
authority to resolve arbitrability questions to the arbitrator.103 In this case, the agreement contains
a delegation clause, incorporates the AAA’s rules, and requires the parties to arbitrate all
disputes.104 20/20 argues that the class waiver is controlling and shows clear intent to preclude
class arbitration.105 However, the issue presented on appeal appeared to be whom parties
delegated resolution of the issue of class arbitration to, not whether class arbitration is
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(“It is a fundamental axion of contract interpretation that specific provisions control general provisions.”) (citing
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allowed.106 Because of this, the issue of arbitrability should actually preclude the issue of
whether class action is allowed.107 Even if there is a clear class action waiver, class arbitrability
is still an issue that needs to be resolved separately and first.108
Additionally, the Fifth Circuit has previously held that incorporating the American
Arbitration Association rules is clear and unmistakable evidence that the parties agreed to
arbitrate arbitrability.109 This combined with a delegation clause that gives the arbitrator the
power to decide questions of arbitrability seem to indicate that an arbitrator should decide the
issue. Even if a class bar is included, this clause should be interpreted by the arbitrator and the
arbitrator should decide whether this bar should apply.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The Fifth Circuit declared that courts, not arbitrators, will decide the gateway issue of
whether class arbitration is available unless there is a clear and unmistakable language that the
arbitrator was granted this power.110 Additionally, general delegation clauses and incorporating
the AAA rules is not enough to grant this power to the arbitrators when a class arbitration bar
exists.111
The Fifth Circuit does not address whether granting an arbitrator power to resolve
arbitrability issues and incorporating the AAA rules, absent a class bar, grants an arbitrator the
power to decide on class arbitration.112 The Fifth Circuit recognizes that the above provisions
could potentially grant an arbitrator the ability to decide gateway issues such as whether class
action is available.113
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